Technology and the Prospects for Natural Gas by Rogner, H.-H.
TECHNOLOGY AND THE PROSPECTS 
FOR NATURAL GAS 
Results of Current Gas Studies 
Hans-Holger Rogner 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Lazenburg, Austria 
RR-88-4 
November 1988 
Reprinted from Energy Policy, February 1988 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Laxenburg, Austria 
Research Reports, which record research conducted at IIASA, are independently 
reviewed before publication. However, the views and opinions they express are 
not necessarily those of the Institute or the National Member Organizations that 
support it. 
Reprinted with permission from Energy Policy, 16 (1), 9-26. 
Copyright© 1988 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmit-
ted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, 
recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in 
writing from the copyright holder. 
Printed by Novographic, Vienna, Austria 
iii 
FOREWORD 
The historically observed shifts in the pattern of energy supply mixes 
have not been the result of resource scarcity but are evolutionary adjust-
ment processes to changing social and economic requirements. 
Socioeconomic adjustment processes usually collude with technical pro-
gress and fundamental technological change. To that extent the past 
shifts in primary energy supplies from wood to coal and eventually to oil 
have been technology rather than energy substitutions supporting 
economic structural change, such as the first industrial revolution or the 
penetration of chemical engineering and the automobile, respectively. 
Presently, structural economic change and new sociopolitical 
requests for cleaner and environmentally benign forms of energy supplies 
demand another shift in the primary energy balance. Natural gas, or its 
main component methane, is well suited to meet this demand. This, and 
not dwindling oil resources, will be the driving force for the anticipated 
shift from oil to natural gas. Again, the role of technology paving the way 
for this transition is of the essence. 
During the course of IIASA's International Gas Study, special 
emphasis was given to the role of technical change and its impact on future 
energy supply scenarios as opposed to the traditional "fixed technology 
projections", underlying most energy and gas analyses. This paper reports 
on the results of this effort. 
F. SCHMIDT-BLEEK 
Program Leader 
Technology, Economy and Society Program 

Over recent years advances in the 
fields of geosciences and drilling tech-
nologies resulted in notable additions 
to the global hydrocarbon resource 
base. Similar advances occurred within 
the downstream parts of the energy 
sector. Somehow these changes have 
not been recognized by most energy 
analysts and thus are not reflected in 
their resource estimates or long-term 
energy projections. Although technol-
ogy advances are not restricted to any 
particular area or type of fuel, there now 
seems to be growing evidence that 
most probably the balance will tilt sub-
stantially in favour of natural gas. This 
paper Is an attempt to account for the 
impact of present and future technical 
changes on the longer term European 
primary energy mix. 
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1N.W. Peebles, Prospects for Natural Gas 
Through to the Year 2000, 16th World Gas 
Conference, IGU!TFl-85 International Gas 
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2Usually in form of static reserve-to-
production ratios or recovery rates. These 
ratios, however, are one time snap shots 
based on existing exploration and produc-
tion technologies and neglect the aspects 
of dynamic technical change. 
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At the outset of his contribution to the 16th World Gas Conference 
M. W.H. Peebles 1 presented the sequence of distinct steps conventional-
ly adopted for the assessment of future supply and demand for energy in 
general and for natural gas in particular. Typically , the assessment of 
the prospects for natural gas begins with the conceptualization of an 
overall business perspective. Since the era of predominant dependence 
on oil is likely to last well into the 21st century and economic 
performance continues to be highly sensitive to the dynamics of the 
international oil market , the next step defines an outlook for oil. Only 
then does the analysis turn to the assessment of the potential role for 
natural gas within the setting defined by the two preceding steps. 
However, one essential factor is omitted from most gas studies. 
Technology, though implicitly present within the numerous 
assumptions2 underlying such analyses on future gas prospects , hardly 
enters energy projections as a variable in its own merits. Consequently, 
these studies disregard the impact of technical progress on the 
composition of future primary energy supply mixes. The delicacy of this 
omission will be elaborated within a comparison of the results of recent 
gas studies. 
The business perspective 
Table 1 contains a rough breakdown of the principal components of 
major natural gas studies. The overall business perspective serves as the 
background against which future energy demand and supply patterns 
will be assessed. Basically, this step is an attempt to identify the 
economic and political climate at the macro level and aims at a 
quantification of the dynamics and trends of those factors impinging 
directly or indirectly on energy demand . First of all these include future 
economic growth patterns, ie the volume and quality of economic 
activity and the effects of industrial structural change on energy 
intensities. 
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Table 1. Components of major gas studies. 
Business perspective 
Industrial activity and structural change 
Energy conservation, price responsiveness 
Environment 
Energy policy 
Outlook for oil 
Prices v supplies 
Prospects for natural gas 
Resource base 
lnterfuel competition 
Gas-to-gas competition (recently) 
Spot market (recently) 
3 Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani , OPEC and the 
World Oil Outlook, The Economist Intelli-
gence Unit, Special Report No 140, EIU, 
London, UK, 1983. 
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Second , the future potential of price-induced energy conservation 
must be quantified. In the wake of extended periods of low oil market 
prices the question of permanent v temporary conservation effects 
becomes an important issue. 
Third, there is the host of government regulatory constraints and 
energy policies which impact on the level and mix of energy consump-
tion. Environment oriented regulations towards reduced stack emis-
sions change the economics and preference for individual fuels though 
not necessarily in a consistent way. For example , electricity at the point 
of consumption is highly preferable which is not always the case at the 
point of generation. Energy policy influences both the absolute levels of 
energy demand and supply as well as the composition of energy 
consumption. Most notably there is the dichotomy between the 
perceived value of domestic resources v the critical level of dependence 
on foreign supplies , particularly from politically diverse sources. Energy 
policy usually means interference with , and distortion of, the free 
interplay of market forces and may result in an unfair advantage/ 
disadvantage for a particular fuel v its competitors. 
The ou1look for oil 
The outlook for oil, ie availability and international market price of oil, 
has been and will continue to remain the yardstick for all other energy 
forms. However , in an effective market environment one would not 
expect any other criteria than burnertip competitiveness as the market 
clearing mechanism. It is the inherently long lead times required for any 
significant change in the demand and supply structures which preserve 
the dominating role of oil and sensitize energy markets. 
In the recent past even minor changes in the oil business have had 
major destabilizing effects. There is OPEC's shift from being the 
world's principal supplier to a swing producer. It is the OPEC multiplier 
phenomenon (Mossavar-Rahmani, 1983),3 ie the combined effects of 
investments dynamics within the typical business cycle and the 
over-reaction of virtually all agents involved in the production, 
transport, refining, distribution and consumption of oil, which again 
retain the. quasi reference role of oil in current and future energy 
markets. 
In summary, the potential for interfuel substitution of other forms of 
energy for oil will over and above burnertip competitiveness depend on 
the perceived availability and the anticipated price of oil. 
Prospects for natural gas 
Factors most relevant to natural gas include an appreciation of the 
resource base , the interfuel competition and contract/pricing issues all 
of which centre around the specific properties of methane. Resources 
are plentiful but distances between resource locations and consumption 
centres have been continuously increasing. This aggravates the tradi-
tional transportation disadvantage of natural gas. In addition , geopoli-
tical concerns are being expressed whenever the large-scale use of the 
world's largest known gas reserves of the USSR and the Middle East is 
considered. 
Interfuel competition for natural gas is usually restricted to stationary 
applications which by definition excludes the transport sector. Further-
more the decomposition of methane requires high temperature heat and 
thus limits its use in the feedstock market. 
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4 Harvard University, Prospects for Natural 
Gas Trade in North America and Western 
Europe: Reports of Two Executive Ses-
sions, Discussion Paper Series E-85-08, 
Harvard International Gas Study, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Cam-
bridge, MA, USA, 1985. 
5 Peebles, op cit, Ref 1. 
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The pricing of natural gas, to a large extent, is subject to institutional 
influences and policies with free market forces and competitiveness 
playing often no more than a marginal role. 
Because of the recent surplus , gas supply capacity in major gas 
markets , gas-to-gas competition, or signs of a possible development of a 
spot market have received attention. Here, the main concern relates to 
the adverse effects of price cutting competition to recover some of the 
sunk capital on the producers' incentive to commit investments in new 
production capacity. Also spot sales have created some unease in an 
otherwise precisely 'contracted' market. 
The missing element 
The commonality of the approach underlying most gas studies together 
with the uncertainties arising from political events of the 1970s 
regarding security of supplies , the wide fluctuations in energy prices plus 
major world fuel trade and consumption distortions have led to very 
cautious and almost uniform energy demand projections. The modest 
energy demand growth expectation for the remainder of this century 
and the present oversupply situation have in many areas lifted the 
concerns with regard to energy supplies. A flamboyant demand-creates-
its-own-supply attitude is prevailing in many energy related fields. 
During the early 1980s when the contracted market began to break 
down and the long-term supply from secure sources became an issue 
quite a few gas studies were performed. By and large these gas studies, 
eg conducted by the International Gas Union, the International Energy 
Agency , Commission of European Communities , the Data Research 
Institute, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology or Harvard 
University adhere to the principals of economics, ie ' natural gas must be 
priced competitively downstream'4 or 'the ability of the industry to bring 
remotely located reserves to market at the right time, in sufficient 
quantity, and at marketable prices which at the same time offer the 
supplier an acceptable economic return' 5 as the decisive criteria in their 
analyses. However , economics is , to a large extent, a derivative of 
policy and technology. Both factors are usually poorly represented. 
Regarding the policy factor the pervasive influence of governments 
and energy policies is acknowledged ('policy is everything in an enough 
of everything situation') but usually kept as fixed parameters over the 
entire projection horizon. But government policies are subject to 
change, a fact disregarded by many energy/gas studies. Self-fulfilling 
prognosis is often the outcome of this procedure. For example, a policy 
that inhibits gas from being used as a fuel for electricity generation will , 
if maintained in an economic analysis, exclude gas from the supply mix 
of the electricity sector despite its potential economic viability. Planning 
for the future based on such intelligence might forfeit valuable market 
shares for natural gas. 
Even more significant than constant energy policies are the conse-
quences of constant technology energy projections. The major forces of 
the last decade which countered the 'running-out projections' of the 
Club of Rome , the perception of an inelastic energy demand or 
eventually the power of OPEC are, to a large extent, attributable to 
technology. The term technology as used in this context includes 
productivity and efficiency increases as well as infrastructural adjust-
ments - in short all those elements that can be subsumed under 
'technical progress or dynamics of technology'. It is intriguing that the 
11 
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Figure 1. Global primary energy sub-
stitution. 
Source: Griibler and Nakicenovic.7 
"Market share of a technology or primary 
energy form over the market share not 
reached by this technology. 
bf= market share. 
csol!us = solar and/or fusion. 
6The Gas Research Institute in its 1985 
GR/ Baseline Projection of US Energy 
Supply and Demand to 2010 for the first 
time included a revised technology scenar-
io after recognizing that technological de-
velopments within GRI funded R&D prog-
rammes were in conflict with the projec-
tions in some critical areas. Another ex-
ception from this constant technology 
approach is an article by P. Tempest, 
'Beyond the rainbow: gas in the twenty-
first century', in Melvin A. Conant, ed, The 
World Gas Trade: A Resource for the 
Future, Westview Press, UK, 1986. 
7 Arnulf Grubler and N. Nakicenovic, The 
Dynamic Evolution of Methane Technolo-
gies, Working Paper WP-87-2, Internation-
al Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria, 1987. 
8
'There is an old and well-justified joke that 
if a cost-benefit analysis had been made 
at the crucial time, then sail would have 
never given way to steam'. Jerry R. 
Ravetz,' 'Usable knowledge, usable ignor-
ance: incomplete science with policy im-
plications', paper presented at the Sustain-
able Development of the Biosphere Task 
Force Meeting, International Institute: for 
Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Au-
~tria, 27-31 August, 1984. 
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evolution of technical progress has been ignored in most gas studies and 
their specific projections and assessments have been based on state-of-
the-art technology only. 6 
Unlike energy policy , technology cannot change overnight. Invention 
and innovation, however, the driving forces behind technical progress 
and economic development, are always present though often undetect-
able in the short run . Hence, in a study concerned with short-term 
forecasts of natural gas prospects, eg gas sales for the next quarter or so, 
technological change will not be a critical variable, but in any study 
which looks 10 or more years into the future, technology may impact the 
market realities at the same rate as does energy policy. Although we are 
unable to predict the future policies, one can be assured that tomorrow's 
technology will differ from today's. A sound portion of understanding of 
the dynamics of technology is a prerequisite in any longer term energy 
demand and supply planning exercise. Strategic planning depends on a 
consistent analytical framework which at least should account for 
prospective technological change. Historical developments can serve, at 
least as zero order, guidelines when specifying assumptions for future 
technology evolutions. 
Over the last 150 years the global energy system has experienced a 
number of evolutionary changes as the fuel mix shifted from the 
dominance of wood to coal and subsequently to oil (see Figure 1). These 
substitutions of one form of primary energy for another have occurred 
in collusion with fundamental technological change and are technology 
rather than energy substitutions. Furthermore , these shifts have been 
independent of the actual resource situation, ie the world was not 
running out of coal when oil began to displace coal. Even economics was 
not the initial driving force until an oil accommodating infrastructure 
was developed and the learning curve and economics of scale became 
effective. The reason for the success of oil increasing its market share 
against coal is that oil is superior to coal in many dimensions and better 
suited to society's needs. A least cost energy supply analysis performed 
at the beginning of this century would most likely have suggested that 
coal supply is getting into a squeeze a few decades down the road and 
missed the potential for oil entirely.8 
Today we experience a situation which resembles the initial stages of 
the oil for coal substitution . Again oil resources are still plentiful. But 
society has been sensitized by the destabilizing events of the 1970s, 
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"Tempest, op cit, Ref 6. 
10 ln addition, during the 1960s the western 
European natural gas market received its 
initial growth momentum from the cheap 
gas of the large Dutch Groningen field. 
Without the Groningen gas the European 
gas market might not have developed until 
the development of the North Sea after the 
first oil price hike in 1973/7 4 if at all. 
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recognlZlng the geopolitical risk of today's dependence on OPEC oil 
and becoming increasingly aware of the environmental consequences of 
fossil fuel consumption. Natural gas offers unique opportunities for 
improvements on all the above counts. Efficiencies of gas in end-use 
conversions exceed those of oil and thus enhance energy conservation. 
Methane (CH4 ) contains less carbon than oil, ie less carbon dioxide 
(C02) emissions and is essentially free of sulphur dioxide (S02). And 
methane is geographically a more evenly distributed resource even by 
traditional resource assessment standards. 'Almost a hundred countries 
have proven gas reserves adequate for commercial exploitation' .9 
Furthermore , natural gas fits better into the increasing complexity of 
our industrialized infrastructure where flexibility through integration 
becomes more and more important. In other words, oil (technologies) 
appear to have reached, at least in the industrialized countries , a 
maximum degree of maturity within a technology's life cycle. This does 
not imply that the days of oil are numbered in the near future. As Figure 
1 shows, substitution in the primary energy market is a slow process and 
it takes some 60 to 80 years for a new energy form to reach a market 
share of 50%. Therefore oil will continue to be the dominant fuel well 
into the 21st century. 
The question arises how can one introduce technological change into 
natural gas studies without drifting off into science fiction but still grasp 
the essential technology prospects which will emerge in the near , 
medium and far future. The technology substitution dynamics of the 
past provide an upper limit for the market penetration of natural gas, ie 
the slopes of the curves in Figure 1 serve as a measure of how fast 
infrastructures and societies can adopt a new form of energy at a macro 
level. Actually, natural gas has been contributing to the global energy 
mix for quite some time - though before the 1970s primarily in North 
America - and thus is not an absolute new source of energy . What is 
important in the context of natural gas studies concerns the degree of 
maturity of the gas industries and their associated technologies. 
So far natural gas has been the stepsister of oil. First of all natural gas 
production has been a byproduct of oil production. Also until recently 
most of the non-associated natural gas reserves have been discovered in 
the search for oil. One major implication of this inlaw relationship is 
that despite the obvious physical differences natural gas has been an 'oil 
technology' rather than a technology in its own right. 
At the end-use side natural gas happened to fit the existing 
distribution and consumption infrastructure, a reminiscence of the old 
town gas era. Without major infrastructural adaptation it was possible 
to economically market an oil production byproduct. 10 However , 
energy policies in many countries have not reflected the value of natural 
gas for their respective economies. Either end-use prices were kept at 
extremely low levels at a fraction of directly competing fuels (essentially 
oil products and electricity) while at the same time strict controls 
inhibited the use in certain economic sectors; or prices were raised 
above competitive levels (gas premium) so as to reflect the perceived 
scarcity of oil and gas reserves. The latter attitude invited the 
appearance of the USSR and Algeria on the European gas market. This 
in turn opened the whole array of supply security issues. The result, in 
one way or another , was an artificial imbalance between natural gas 
demand and supply which still dominates the thinking of many strategic 
planners. 
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"Robert A. Hefner Ill , 'Natural gas - the 
politically and environmentally benign 
least-cost energy for successful 21st cen-
tury economies, the energy path to a better 
world', paper presented at the First Inter-
national Conference on Shallow Oil and 
Gas Resources, The GHK Companies, 
Oklahoma City, USA, 1984. 
12 /bid. 
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Hence statistical evidence on methane technology productivity has 
been distorted by this close association with oil. An assessment of future 
natural gas prospects based on an implicit technology transfer from oil 
to methane therefore most likely misses the true potential for natural 
gas. In a first step, one must acknowledge and understand the geological 
and technological differences between oil and methane. With regard to 
geology natural gas is 'not limited in commercial quantity by the unique 
trapping circumstances necessary for the commercial production of oil' 
and thus geographically more evenly distributed than oil. The failure in 
oil exploration in the past made 'many countries believe that they 
possess little or no natural gas' . 11 Meanwhile quite a few countries have 
been successful in their gas exploration activities. 
Technically the difference between oil and gas concerns the physical 
properties of methane, ie natural gas is compressible, liquid oil is not. 
This means that 'gas can be produced from rocks through which oil 
cannot even move. Additionally, a barrel of oil produced from 30 000 
feet is still a barrel of oil at the surface; whereas a barrel of gas at 30 000 
feet can be as many as 500 bbl of methane at the surface. Thus, as one 
drills deeper, the quantity of gas recoverable from any given reservoir is 
increased by each additional increment of pressure, and reservoirs of 
lesser quality become more and more capable of commercial gas 
production' . 12 
Unlike oil, natural gas reserves are not confined to a maximum depth 
because of pressure considerations. The greater depth of natural gas 
reserves, ie because of pressure, temperature and rock conditions, 
requires, for commercial methane production, different and more 
advanced drilling technologies than those deployed in oil production. 
Today, methane exploration, drilling and production technologies 
suitable for gas from deeper and tight formation fields are in their 
embryonic stages of development. Over time these technologies will 
mature and their productivity will increase so as to make the production 
of methane from fields other than conventional oil domains a 
commercially viable undertaking. One should note that these technol-
ogies are primarily addons to existing infrastructures and technologies 
and do not imply quantum jumps like technical breakthroughs. What is 
required is a quantum jump in perception. As much as the automobile 
industry became an industry in its own rights once the step from adding 
an engine to a horse cart towards an integrated automobile design was 
accomplished , methane technology will gain momenti:m once emanci-
pated from oil technologies. 
Similar evolutions will also be experienced at the levels of gas 
transmission , distribution and end-use conversion which will further 
enhance the efficiency of gas use compared to other fuels , contribute to 
the improvement of vital environment conditions and function as a 
chemical tether for industrial development and integration. And there 
are two major energy consuming sectors which traditionally have not 
been the focus of methane marketing strategies - electricity generation 
and the transport sector. The former market has been foreclosed 
because of institutional regulations in many countries while the latter 
suffered from an economic methane-to-synthetic gasoline conversion 
technology. 
In the long run, both markets offer opportunities for methane 
accommodation . Environmental considerations and sociopolitical 
acceptance problems associated with nuclear power in particular and 
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13The economic failure of the New Zealand 
methane-to-gasoline conversion effort is a 
direct consequence of the indirect (two-
stage) conversion process. Since both 
stages (gas-to-methanol and catalytic 
methanol-to-gasoline conversion) are 
associated with conversion losses (overall 
thermal efficiency of 54%), the economics 
did not turn out right despite relatively low 
natural gas prices. 
14Actually, Ruhrgas used the bulk avail-
ability of USSR gas at attractive prices 
both as a negotiating card in the Troll 
contract talks and as an incentive for the 
Netherlands to extend their gas export 
contracts for at least another 10 years. The 
threat of Soviet gas changed the initial 
Norwegian expectation of a premium for 
the high-cost but secure supplies from 
within western Europe to market-related 
prices. Indeed, the Netherlands also ex-
tended their major export obligations for 
another 10 years. 
15Jonathan P. Stern, International Gas 
Trade in Europe: The Policies of Exporting 
and Importing Countries, Heinemann Edu-
cational Books, London, UK, 1984. 
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megaprojects in general may pave the way for gas into the electricity 
generating sector. New technologies , like highly efficient multi-stage 
combined cycle turbines in the kW to MW range , could be instrumental 
in a shift from centralized to decentralized electricity/cogeneration 
systems. These combined cycle units appear to have relatively flat 
economics-to-scale prospects which implies increased flexibility in unit 
sizes. At times of highly uncertain electricity demand outlooks this is of 
importance for utility capacity planning. Small unit sizes quasi available 
off-the-shelf and short construction periods of six months or so would 
significantly reduce upfront capital requirements and thus decrease the 
risk of utility investments. 
Without an efficient methane-to-gasoline conversion process methane 
use in non-stationary applications will remain inferior to oil based motor 
fuels. Although many research activities are targetted towards the 
development of a direct (catalytic) conversion process , additional 
efforts are required before commercial availability can be achieved. 
Such a technical breakthrough would have a favourable impact on the 
prospects for natural gas in developing countries in terms of both 
domestic energy supplies and gas exports simply because the transport 
economics for a liquid (at ambient temperature and pressure) would 
correspond to those for conventional oil products. 13 
Most energy projections avoid the difficulties of dealing with the 
impact of increasing knowledge on resource availability or on energy 
prices. Indeed , projecting the dynamics of productivity performance or 
innovation is a highly uncertain and risky undertaking but a necessary 
step in order to understand longer term energy demand and supply. The 
omission of innovation and new technologies explains, at least partly, 
the poor track record of conventional energy studies. The following 
paragraphs compare the differences of these conservative and risk 
averse approaches with an attempt to introduce technical progress in a 
Jong-term gas study. 
The impacts of technical change on the European gas market 
Technology and policy 
The European gas market is characterized by a highly uncertain gas 
demand outlook which, to a large extent, is a direct consequence of 
even more uncertain gas supply prospects. Medium to longer term gas 
supplies , though plentiful in terms of available reserves and resources, 
are either only of marginal economic attractiveness (given current 
energy price profiles and state-of-the-art technologies) or stem from 
politically diverse sources. The agreement on the development of the 
highly capital intensive Troll field between Statoil and a European 
Consortium led by Ruhrgas AG signed in spring 1986 could have 
stabilized the supply outlook had the timing not coincided with the fast 
decay of world oil prices. Since Ruhrgas has not been receptive to an 
open gas-to-gas competition (cheaper gas deliveries could have been 
made available by the USSR), 14 it occurs that the 'commercial 
realities" 5 are not necessarily those factors which determine the levels 
of domestic gas production and dominate the negotiations of gas import 
contracts. The influence of 'non-commercial realities', ie national 
macroeconomic objectives and gas resource policies, foreign trade 
relations, geopolitics and supply security concerns , overshadows the 
technically feasible and economically viable market potential for natural 
gas in western Europe. 
15 
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16Government regulation will certainly con-
tinue to impact international gas trade but 
also will be visible in most national mar-
kets. The recent deregulation of the US 
gas market is a consequence of the 
adverse effects of the price controls by the 
Natural Gas Policy Act. In essence this act 
created a split gas market. Pipelines cros-
sing state boundaries (interstate pipelines) 
as well as the wellhead pricing of such 
transported gas have been subject to 
federal regulation and jurisdiction. Hence, 
if a producer sold gas to an interstate 
pipeline system, the price was regulated. If 
sold within the state produced the price 
was determined by local competition pri-
marily. The net effect was ample supply of 
relatively cheap local gas and a regulation-
induced shortage of cheap interstate gas. 
In 1978 efforts to rectify this distorted 
situation led to a partial regulation of the 
intrastate market. In 1985 gas from certain 
vintages and deep or tight formations was 
decontrolled which was the turning point to 
further deregulation steps. 
17 Purvin and Gertz, Western Europe Natu-
ral Gas Industry Market and Economic 
Analysis to 2000, London, UK, 1982. Pur-
vin and Gertz, Western Europe Natural 
Gas Industry Market and Economic Analy-
sis to 2000, London, UK, 1984. 
18H-H. Rogner, S. Messner, M. Strubegger 
and A. Golovine, The I/ASA International 
Gas Study, Discussion paper for Gas 
Meeting at Krainer HOite, International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria, 17-18 October, 1985. 
'
9Simon A. Blakey, 'Europe's natural gas 
industries', in Melvin A. Conant, ed, The 
World Gas Trade: A Resource for the 
Future, Westview Press, London, UK, 
1986. 
16 
Therefore, apart from technical improvements , the competitiveness 
of natural gas in various energy markets will depend on a variety of 
related economic and institutional factors. Most importantly , there are 
the problems of the large upfront investment volumes in the methane 
transport infrastructure , the terms of actual sales contracts, gas pricing 
principles , take-or-pay clauses , etc but also political acceptability of gas 
deliveries from certain regions or gas purchases motivated by considera-
tions other than volumes and prices. Generally contracts including all 
these factors have to be signed prior to any investment in the gas 
production and transmission system (see Troll agreement). And once a 
contract has been signed , both producer and importer are locked into 
this arrangement for as long as 20 to 30 years. The need for such 
long-term contracts is the combined effect of the enormous upfront 
capital requirements and the long payback periods associated with 
significant natural gas projects. Though economically viable on a pure 
calculatory basis private investors are not willing to assume the 
economic risk involved or the absolute level of capital outlays exceeds 
the financial capability of individual utilities. Consequently, govern-
ment involvement has become the rule both for guarantee purposes and 
resource management. Hence , gas markets have become more and 
more regulated at a time when there has been a converse tendency - the 
growing spot market for oil and coal. 16 
The net effect of these institutional constraints can be summarized 
into the currently dominating wisdom that European natural gas 
demand is more price elastic with respect to rising than to falling 
prices. 17· 18 •19 Clearly , the gas delivery contracts and their underlying 
pricing principles reflect either the objective of supplying gas at prices 
competitive v alternative fuels , the costs of avoiding the use of 
alternative fuels or, in some extreme cases, oil price parity at the point 
of production. Whatever case may be applicable, the determination of 
the sales price for gas ranged at the upper end with respect to burnertip 
competitiveness , given the existing technical environment. Any rise in 
prices , therefore , would cause a stronger response than a corresponding 
decline. 
The IIASA gas study assessed the technoeconomic potential for 
natural gas in Europe assuming a gradual relaxation of most internal (ie 
national or regional) policies and institutional constraints effectively 
distorting gas ' competitiveness in various energy markets. These 
relaxations include , for example , banning gas from certain applications 
(electricity generation) or protectionism of electricity v gas in end-use 
markets or active gas-to-gas competition. The latter aspect creates a 
more favourable position for continued oil (and coal) substitution. 
Current geopolitical and supply ser;urity considerations which affect 
import volumes from some of the politically diverse sources served as 
guidelines - in the short run - for the natural gas trade flows but not as 
hard-wired limits or import ceilings. 
Since institutional limits are difficult to project , one of the prime 
objectives of the IIASA study concerned the impact of a changing 
technical environment on the future prospects for natural gas. Conse-
quently, technical progress constituted one of the most crucial scenario 
parameters in this study. Indigenous resource extraction costs and 
market prices were based on marginal (levelized) costs plus royalties 
(profits) and government take . Also there existed no link between 
domestic oil/oil product prices and methane prices. Import prices for 
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°Commission of European Communities 
(CEC), Energy 2000, by J-F. Guilmont, D. 
McGlue, P. Valette and C. Waeterloos, 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
21 Data Resources Inc, The ORI Report on 
Natural Gas Markets in Europe, Paris, 
1984. 
22Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE), Energy Data Bank, Geneva, 1986. 
231nternational Energy Agency (IEA), Natu-
ral Gas Prospects, OECD, Paris, 1986. 
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crude oil , oil products, and coal were exogenously determined, while 
gas import prices were the combined result of a weak link to oil prices 
and the concept of long-term marginal resource rents. 
The Conventional Technology Scenario 
The Conventional Technology Scenario represents a business-as-usual 
scenario where technical progress was assumed to follow trends that 
have emerged since the first oil price hike in 1973/74. In particular, the 
Conventional Technology Scenario includes energy productivity im-
provements on the energy end-use part of the energy system such as 
industrial boilers, furnaces, etc and residential/commercial space 
heating technologies and appliances. One should note that energy 
saving measures such as better energy management or the existing 
standards for the insulation of the housing stock have been accounted 
for in the useful energy demand scenario calculations. By the same 
token the industrial useful energy demand assumptions already reflect 
the effects of the anticipated economic structural change. 
Since technical progress is not restricted to one particular fuel or 
technology, and not to discriminate between fuels, a uniform efficiency 
growth rate was applied to each category of end-use technologies. 
Roughly, an efficiency increase for thermal conversion purposes of 
some 25% in the residential and commercial sectors and of 15% in 
industries was applied. 
Burnertip competition was the decision criteria in the calculations for 
the cost-optimal primary energy mix. Given the current glut in all 
European energy markets, a 'demand creates its own supply' situation 
was assumed for the short run. Competition between energy imports 
and indigenous production becomes a central issue where vintage 
structure and sunk capital cost considerations play a dominant role. 
Consequently, within the infrastructure framework of the energy system 
fuel switching or interfuel substitution is primarily a function of relative 
prices. 
In the long run, energy supply appeared not to be resource 
constrained and a least-cost supply strategy based on essentially 
state-of-the-art technologies was pursued. Table 2 contains the interna-
tional oil market price development underlying the IIASA analyses. 
The results of the IIASA Conventional Technology Scenario are 
summarized in Figure 2. The Conventional Technology Scenario 
development of the West European primary energy mix in Figure 2 
corresponds to the findings of most other energy studies such as Energy 
2000 of the Commission of European Communities (CEC),20 Data 
Resources Inc,21 the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)22 (see 
Table 3) or implicitly the International Energy Agency (IEA). 23 Unlike 
the IIASA, CEC and ECE projections, which account for the dynamics 
of the entire primary energy balance, the IEA study only reports future 
natural gas developments for western Europe. However, the evolution 
of the primary energy system underlying the IEA gas analyses by and 
Table 2. Oil price development in the Conventional Technology Scenario, 198G-2030 
(%). 
1985 US$1bbl 
1985 ECU/bbl" 
1980 
39.8 
45.1 
1985 
27.8 
31 .5 
8 ECU - European currency unit. 
1990 
22.5 
25.5 
1995 
25 
28 
2000 
27 
31 
2010 
33 
38 
2020 
44 
50 
2030 
49 
56 
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Figure 2. Western Europe, Conven-
tional Technology Scenario, primary 
energy consumption, 1980-2030. 
24When comparing the numerical findings 
of these studies one should bear in mind 
that there are some geographical dissimi-
larities regarding the regional aggregation 
used by these studies. The GEG study 
includes the EG-1 O members, the IEA 
study compasses OEGD-Europe, the EGE 
aggregation accounts for all west Euro-
pean countries, while the llASA regional 
aggregation also includes Yugoslavia in 
western Europe. Therefore any discussion 
of, and comparisons between, these stu-
dies will be restricted to relative terms such 
as the evolution of the primary energy mix 
in terms of percentage shares, etc. Fur-
thermore, the study horizon of the llASA 
study extends to the year 2030, the IEA 
study horizon ends by the year 2010 while 
the GEG and EGE projections do not look 
beyond the turn of the century. Therefore 
the year 2000 will be used as a reference 
year for the comparison of future primary 
energy trends. 
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Table 3. Primary energy mix of major energy studies (%). 
1980' 
llASA ECE CEC 
Oil 52.7 53.0 53.6 
Coal 21.3 21.2 23.0 
Natural gas 14.3 14.7 17.5 
Nuclear 3.8 3.9 4.4 
Hydro and other 8.0 7.2 1.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
PEC=70.6 EJ/1577 
mtoe 
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2030 
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arnfference in 1980 because of geographical dissimilarities and different conversion factors. 
large resembles the CEC and ECE projections . 24 The commonalities of 
these projections include: 
e substantial displacement of oil to less than 40% by the year 2000; 
e significant increase in the contribution of nuclear power ; 
e a constant share for solid fuels (hard coal and lignite) ; and 
e constant to, at best , slightly increasing shares for natural gas. 
Dissimilarities between these studies relate primarily to the evolution of 
primary energy consumption in absolute terms, the rate of expansion of 
nuclear power and the future contributions of renewable energy 
sources. The IIASA primary energy growth rates fall behind those of 
the CEC, ECE and IEA which are the result of different expectations 
regarding future economic growth rates , the assumed rate of structural 
change and the improvements in energy performance. For example, the 
CEC study bases its energy consumption projections on a gross 
domestic product (GDP) expansion of some 2 .8%/year for the period 
1984-2000 (II ASA 2.3% ). In contrast to a lower economic growth 
expectation, the IIASA study assumes a more progressive improvement 
in the energy intensity than the CEC. The combined effect of these 
assumptions translates into diverging primary energy growth rates or 
primary energy-GDP elasticities of 0.22 in the IIASA study and of 0.51 
in Energy 2000, respectively. 
In the IIASA study the contribution of nuclear power does not reach 
the market shares achieved in the ECE, IEA and CEC analyses. Two 
major reasons account for this difference. First, the lower economic 
activity underlying the IIASA projections. Second, the IIASA study 
was completed in Autumn 1986 and thus accounted for both recent 
changes in public attitudes towards nuclear energy and the generally 
lower energy price profiles than those prevailing one or two years ago. 
Of interest is also the distribution of methane use between various 
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energy consuming sectors, the dynamics of which take different 
directions in these studies . While both the ECE and CEC projections 
foresee a significant decline of gas as a fuel for electricity generation by 
the year 2000 (see Table 4 which depicts a reduction of 5.6 and 7.1 
percentage points respectively), the IIASA and !EA studies do not 
anticipate such a strong reduction in gas use for this sector (minus some 
3.5 percentage points). ECE , !EA and CEC project a growing gas 
reliance of the residential/commercial sectors which offsets the decline 
in the electricity sector (and in the cases of the !EA and CEC also of the 
industrial sector) while in the IIASA analyses a shift from the 
residential/commercial to the industrial sector occurs. 
Explanations for these diverging trends can be derived from: 
e the low GDP-primary energy elasticity of the IIASA study which 
implies an even stronger restructuring of the industrial sector and a 
shift to more efficient and more flexible industrial boilers and 
furnaces than assumed, eg in the CEC study; 
e the explicit inclusion of energy consumption density categories and 
category-specific natural gas distribution costs in the IIASA study 
may have discriminated gas use in low density areas; 
e the general tendency of the IEA and CEC to favour coal over oil 
and gas in the industrial and central conversion sectors; 
e in the IIASA study no energy carrier was barred from any specific 
energy sector; and 
e the longer time horizon of the IIASA study until the year 2030 
which automatically includes a different , ie larger and less geopoliti-
cally constrained, energy resource availability concept. 
In summary, the IIASA Conventional Technology Scenario repeats , on 
the aggregate, the qualitative projections of the ECE, IEA and CEC. 
By and large this is not an unexpected result. The basic assumptions 
regarding energy resource availability. energy production and conver-
sion technologies or energy transportation infrastructures follow similar 
trends. However, on a more disaggregated level, the agreements 
between these studies begin to disappear. The explicit introduction of 
technical progress for the energy conversion facilities of the industrial 
and residential/commercial sectors as well as the unrestricted , ie by 
energy policy , use of natural gas in all sectors resulted in diverging 
energy consumption profiles . The expansion of technical progress to the 
energy supply system, therefore , should result in a further divergence of 
such future trends and eventually be even felt at the aggregate level of 
primary energy consumption. 
Table 4. Sectoral distribution of natural gas consumption, 1980-2010 (% and billion cubic metres). 
1980 1990 2000 2010 
Sector llASA IEA' ECE0 CEC llASA IEA' ECE0 CEC llASA IEA' ECE" CEC llASA IEA' ECE° CEC 
Industries 33.7 38.2 34.5 35.6 36.5 33.6 34.1 32.3 39.3 36.4 35.1 34.6 40.9 39.0 
Non-energy 1.3 2.6 4 .2 2.0 2.4 4.9 3.2 2.4 5 .7 4.6 
Residential/ 
commercial 44.7 44.6 44.4 40.8 40.4 49.2 46.9 44.8 38.9 47 .5 49.9 47.4 37.0 48.5 
Transport 0.7 0.2 0.2 0 .2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0 .3 
Central 
conversion 15.4 14.1 18.2 14.6 14.8 13.1 16.6 13.1 12.8 11.4 12.6 7.1 11.4 8.2 
Losses 4.2 2.9 4.5 5.7 3 .9 4.9 5.3 4.3 5.2 5.7 4.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total in bcm 219 214 201 203 256 244 261 228 290 280 277 235 328 305 
8 1EA - High Demand/Low Oil Price Scenario; non-energy use included in industries. 
blesses included in central conversion . 
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The Technical Evolution Scenario 
The Technical Evolution Scenario extends the technical progress 
beyond the end-use technologies to all stages of the energy chain 
from resource extraction to end-use conversion. Apart from improving 
existing or conventional technologies, this scenario also implies the 
availability and introduction of new exploration and production 
technologies, advanced equipment for the construction of gas mains, 
new maintenance and monitoring systems for pipelines , as well as direct 
methane-to-gasoline conversion , new electricity/cogeneration and other 
advances in energy end-use technologies. Tahle 5 contains a summary of 
advanced technologies which potentially may become instrumental for 
future productivity improvements along the entire gas chain. 
The most crucial assumptions in this Technical Evolution Scenario 
concern the productivity growth rates in the drilling sector , the methane 
transport system and the availability of highly efficient methane-to-
electricity conversion facilities. The assumed 4.5 % annual productivity 
improvement for drilling in tight formations corresponds to an order of 
magnitude over the next 50 years which translates into a proven 
Table 5. Current and future technical advances along the gas chain. 
Stage of the 
gas chain 
Exploration 
Drilling/ 
production 
Transport 
-pipe 
-LNG 
Distribution 
Electricity/ 
cogeneration 
Industries 
Commercial 
Residential 
Transport 
a1ncomplete list. 
Technologies• 
Satellite search, aeromagnetic 
mapping, carbon and helium isotope 
ratios, computerized geochemical and 
geophysical prospecting, vegetative 
anomalies, etc 
Measurement while drilling, smart 
down hole electronics, polycrystallic 
diamond bits, improved drill pipe and 
casing materials, improved down hole 
motors, tunnel concepts, sea-bed plat-
forms, gas treatment, etc 
Large diameter pipes. higher press-
ures, automated pipe laying techni-
ques, etc 
Magnetocaloric refrigeration 
Ground-piercing impacters, pipe 
pushers, compacting augers, new 
accurate horizontal drilling techniques, 
improved maintenance and monitoring 
systems, pavement cutting, greater 
mechanization and automatization, 
new materials, etc 
Combined cycle gas turbines, fuel cells 
Steam injected turbines for cogenera-
tion, heat pumps, gas desiccant cool-
ing systems, new industrial furnaces , 
forced drought immersion, oxygen/ 
natural gas burners, recuperative bur-
ners, control systems, modular con-
cepts, etc 
Condensing water heaters, heat 
pumps, cooling systems, heat recup-
eration, etc 
Heat pumps, new furnaces and water 
heaters, condensing and exhaust heat 
recovery. control systems, etc 
CNG, catalytic methan to gasoline con-
version 
Productivity increases assumed in 
the Technical Evolution Scenariob 
Proven gas reserves 
Onshore conventional 
Onshore tight formation 
Offshore deep water 
Average improvement 
Average improvement 
Average improvement 
As ol 1990 
2.5%/year 
2.0%/year 
4.5%/year 
2.5%/year 
1.0%/year 
0.75%/year 
1.25%/year 
0.75%/year 
Average conversion efficiency 
0.5%/year 
Average conversicin efficiency 
0.75%/year 
Average conversion efficiency 
0.75%/year 
Costs for methane based motor fuels 
2.0%/year 
h"fhe llASA study used simplifications and aggregations of new technical developments. The 
productivity increases have to be viewed through the lens of gross averages. 
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25Michel Valais, 'World natural gas pros-
pects', Energy Exploration and Exploita-
tion, Vol 1, No 4, 1983, pp 269-276. 
26M. Strubegger and S. Messner, The 
Influence of Technological Changes on the 
Cost of Gas Supply, Working Paper WP-
86-38, International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 
1986. 
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methane reserve growth rate of some 2%/year (for oil corresponding 
considerations result in less than 0.5% annual reserve expansion). 
Transmission and distribution costs for natural gas dominate even in 
such ultra high cost producing areas as Troll or Sleipner in the North Sea 
(see Table 6). Hence , high productivity increases yielded in the gas 
exploration and drilling sector will render insufficient unless similar 
evolutions can be materialized for methane transport and distribution 
systems. This will be particularly important because of growing 
distances between gas resource locations and consumption centres. 
Rough estimates suggest a tripling of methane travel distances between 
today and the turn of the century .25 In the longer run one might expect a 
trade-off between high cost production close to the point of consump-
tion versus inexpensive production and long distance transmission. 
The productivity growth rate for the transmission and distribution of 
natural gas (potential improvements are listed in Table 5) in the 
Technical Evolution Scenario amount to some 1.2%/year. Other 
essential productivity increases have been projected for gas-fired 
combined cycle turbines . Gas turbines have been a technological 
spin-off from aircraft jet engines and thus continue to benefit the 
research and development efforts regarding better turbine materials and 
designs. The serial combination of combustion and steam turbines 
currently yields efficiencies of 47% to 48% (electricity only) and more 
than 80% of fuel utilization in cogeneration applications. Ongoing 
research to improve material degradation at high combustion tempera-
tures as well as other accompanying activities suggest additional 
productivity gains for gas-fired combined cycles and an efficiency of 
more than 60% (electricity) appears technically feasible in the not so 
distant future (within a 50 year planning horizon) . 
The overall impact of the introduction of technical progress on the 
dynamics of natural gas in the west European energy market is 
portrayed in Figure 3. The corresponding market shares are given in 
Table 7. 
Table 6. Cost structure for methane deliveries in central Europe (adapted from Strubegger and 
Messner). 26 
Cost structure(%) 
Extraction Transport 
Groningen 6 4 
NL offshoreb 9 6 
Ekofisk 16 11 
Statfjord 16 19 
Sleipner 27 11 
Heimdel 32 11 
Troll 27 17 
Gullfaks 34 15 
Tromsc 26 26 
Tromsd 25 28 
Algeria 4 28 
Algeria (LNG) 4 36 
Nigeria 5 36 
Nigeria (LNG) 4 43 
Persian Gulf6 4 32 
Persian Gulf' 3 35 
Persian Gulf (LNG) 3 44 
Urengoy 8 34 
Other/western Siberia 10 35 
3 0istribution costs have been averaged and kept constant for all cases. 
bNL - Netherlands. 
conshore pipeline via Sweden to Hamburg. 
"Offshore pipeline to Emden. 
6 Pipeline transport via Yugoslavia. 
'Pipeline transport via Italy. 
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Figure 3. Western Europe, Technical 
Evolution Scenario, primary energy 
consumption, 1980--2030. 
22 
Table 7. Primary energy mix, Technical Evolution Scenario (TEC) and Conventional Techno-
logy Scenario (CONV) (%). 
1980 2000 2030 
Source TEC CONV TEC CONV 
Oil 52.7 35.6 35 .0 22.6 24.3 
Coal 21.3 19.2 23.5 20.3 26.8 
Natural gas 14.3 20.5 17.3 25.9 18.9 
Nuclear 3.8 13.8 13.6 17.0 16.7 
Hydro and others 8.0 11.0 10.6 14.2 13.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Compared to the Conventional Technology Scenario , Figure 3 reveals 
not only a substantially different evolution for the west European 
primary energy mix but also a 10% reduction in total primary energy 
consumption by the year 2030 ( 4% by 2000). First of all, technical 
progress bettered the overall energy system's efficiency. Second, there 
is a major shift in the composition of primary energy consumption, 
essentially from coal to natural gas, which further improved the energy 
system performance. Finally, natural gas has become the largest single 
primary fuel in western Europe by the year 2030 (market share: 26% ). 
The evolution towards a gas dominated European energy system 
begins to emerge already by the turn of the century though not 
repeating the growth dynamics historically observed with oil: 
e The market share of natural gas exceeds the 20% mark. 
e Coal loses almost 4% of its market share and declines to an 
historical low (since the industrial revolution) of less than 20%. 
e The displacement of oil is only marginally affected by the Technical 
Evolution Scenario . 
The gross consumption of natural gas expands from 220 billion cubic 
metres (bcm) in 1980 to 330 bcm by 2000 which is an increase of 43 bcm 
v the Conventional Technology Scenario. Because of the productivity 
gains underlying the Technical Evolution Scenario, these additional 
natural gas volumes do not translate into corresponding increases in gas 
imports. In fact, the overall gas import dependence from non-European 
sources is reduced by some 30 bcm to 95 bcm (by the year 2000). 
Similarly, oil imports decline by 6% , coal imports by more than 50%. 
Technical change not only lowered the absolute level of oil import 
requirements but also exerted pressure on the international oil market 
price. The oil price development shown in Figure 4 reflects the 
combined effects of the increased gas market share, the reduced 
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Figure 4. Oil price development in 
the Technical Evolution v the Conven-
tional Technology Scenario, 1980-
2030. 
27The price of natural gas imports from 
non-European sources varied between 
70% and 80% of the international oil 
market price (fob at the European entry 
point) . 
28 ln the Conventional Technology Scenar-
io gas imports amount to 135 billion cubic 
metres and indigenous production to 
153 billion cubic metres. 
29R.E. Hanneman, 'Methane technology: a 
technical survey', in eds, T.H. Lee, H. 
linden, D.A. Dreyfus and T. Vasko, The 
Methane Age, Reidel, Dordrecht, Nether-
lands, in press. 
30H-H. Rogner, S. Messner. M. Stiubegger 
and E. Schmidt, The Methane Age, Work-
ing Paper WP-86-68, International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, 
Austria, 1986. 
3
'The total natural gas consumption re-
ported in Table 8 does not include losses 
in the transmission and distribution system 
(approximately 5%). 
ENERGY POLICY February 1988 
Technology and prospects for natural gas 
50 
~ 
O; 
~ 
40 
·c: 
::> 
30 
20 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Year 
ECU (1 g85) 
USS (1985) 
ECU 11985) 
USS (1985) 
2030 
demand for oil imports and the positive impact of technical change on 
the cost profile of European oil production.27 
After the year 2000 the market penetration of natural gas continues at 
the expense of coal and, to a lesser extent, of oil. In 2030 aggregate gas 
consumption amounts to some 480 bcm , 124 of which would originate 
from non-European sources . This implies an indigenous west European 
gas production of some 360 bcm or a doubling of current production 
levels .28 The production level of 360 bcm is the result of the combined 
assumptions regarding technical progress for methane exploration (ie 
the resource base) and drilling (ie tapping the resource base) . These by 
and large non-conventional views on the prospects of technological 
evolution directly translate into economics favouring gas over other 
fuels . In other words, the methane production projections of the 
Technical Evolution Scenario require the existence and the technoeco-
nomic feasibility of tapping gas resources such as Devonian shales, tight 
sands , pure pressure aquifers , gas hydrates , subducted deep deposits 
and other abiogenic sources. For example, Hanneman29 reports 
unconventional gas resources of just the USA at over 250 trillion cubic 
metres (tern). This figure must be viewed versus the current official gas 
reserve figure of some 5.4 tern. Again , one should note , there is no 
implication that these vast resources could be recovered with today's 
technology. 30 
The sectoral uses of natural gas in both scenarios are depicted by 
Table 8. 31 A comparison between the Conventional Technology and 
Technical Evolution Scenarios points to two reciprocal consequences of 
technical progress. These are the efficiency improvements introduced 
Table 8. Sectoral distribution of natural gas consumption. 
1980 2000 2030 
TEC' CONV" TEC' CONV" 
Sector (%) (bcm)° (%) (bcm) (%) (bcm) (%) (bcm) (%) (bcm) 
Industries 35.2 72.6 34.0 106.3 40.2 108.5 28.5 124.0 43.7 160.4 
Feed stocks 1.4 2.9 3.0 9.3 3.4 9.2 8 .7 37.9 9.0 33.0 
ResidentiaV 
commercial 45.4 93.6 30.4 95.1 39.9 107.7 23.7 103.2 37.0 135.7 
Transport 0.7 1.4 1.0 3.2 0.5 1.3 6.6 28.5 0.4 1.5 
Central 
conversion 17.3 35.7 31 .6 98.8 16.0 43.2 32.5 141.2 10.0 36.6 
Total 100.0 206.2 100.0 312.8 100.0 269.8 100.0 434.9 100.0 367.1 
"TEC - Technical Evolution Scenario. 
'CONV - Conventional Technology Scenario. 
COCm - billion cubic metres. 
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by new advanced technologies and the absolute level of fuel consump-
tion. It appears that the efficiency improvements outbalance the 
additions in actual market shares. For example , in absolute terms the 
consumption of natural gas in the residential/commercial sector declines 
by some 12% from 108 bcm to 95 bcm while the share of natural gas 
within this sector remains fairly constant. Hence, the displacement of 
one fuel unit of conventional technology by a more advanced 
technology results in lower fuel sales; a fact many gas utilities observed 
in the past when their sales forecasts based on a one-to-one oil 
substitution strategy did not result in corresponding actual gas pur-
chases. 
The industrial sector is less sensitive than the residential/commercial 
sector and absolute methane consumption declines only marginally. 
New technologies allow for additional gas consumption in the low 
temperature heat market while electricity replaces gas in certain areas of 
high temperature heat applications . The latter is a comprehensive 
process phenomena rather than an energy particularity. 
Considerable growth in natural gas consumption occurs in the central 
electricity and heat ( cogeneration) sector and the transport sector. Both 
sectors experience more than a twofold increase in their gas consump-
tion although the actual gas volumes are quite different. But these 
developments indicate a distinct structural change in the sectoral pattern 
of natural gas consumption , Natural gas as a final energy form , ie as a 
fuel at the energy end-use level, is losing in favour of gas in embodied 
form. 
Already in the year 2000, and certainly more so by the end of the 
study horizon, any expansion of the gas market share at the level of 
primary energy translates into a fast penetration of natural gas into the 
electricity and eventually the transport sector. This also means that the 
industrial and residential/commercial markets offer little room for 
additional gas penetration. In both markets (burnertip) competition 
from district heat and electricity limit the use of methane. Instead, 
natural gas finds a growing niche as a valuable fuel for electricity and 
heat generation . 
The percentage distribution of gas use of Table 8 confirms this trend. 
In the short run, the relative expansion of gas use for electricity 
generation occurs at the expense of the industrial and residential/ 
commercial shares . Both sectors continue to lose market shares 
throughout the study horizon. But now the transport sector, instead of 
the electricity sector, gains the bulk share. Here , the assumption of a 
technically feasible and commercially viable methane-to-synthetic gaso-
line conversion process is a necessary prerequisite. 
Conclusions 
The Technical Evolution Scenario has shown that accounting for 
technical progress in long-term energy scenarios has a considerable 
impact on the future prospects for the west European energy system. In 
other words, major opportunities for an expanded use of natural gas, to 
a large extent, hinge on the successful development of new gas 
utilization and supply technologies. Although technology forecasting is 
as risky a business as any other forecast, there are definite benefits from 
the inclusion of technical change into medium- to long-term energy 
analyses. The principal benefit of such an exercise is to challenge 
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conventional wisdom which tends to extrapolate the status quo of 
technical and economic conditions into the future. In the Technical 
Evolution Scenario extrapolation is of the essence also. However, here 
an attempt was made to extrapolate the dynamics of technologies and 
study their consequences for the future market penetration of natural 
gas. Another important factor concerns the mutual influence of energy 
policy and conventional wisdom. For example, the myth of the 1970s 
had it that natural gas is a scarce resource and kept in the ground would 
be worth more than in the market place. This perception changed with 
the discovery of major gas fields of the North Sea, particular of Troll, 
and the penetration of Soviet and Algerian gas into the European gas 
market. By the same token the environmental benignity of natural gas 
consumption has been used to request, at least, parity prices on 
equivalent calorific terms with oil. Technology, therefore, could be the 
vehicle to overcome these myths, turn submarginal resources into 
economically recoverable reserves and thus pave the way for natural gas 
to become a globally dominating fuel. 
Given the current energy bubble, the spark for technical change to 
pick up momentum has to occur at the level of gas utilizing technologies. 
This is to say that, in the short run, improvements of existing boilers, 
furnaces, gas turbines as well as the simultaneous development of new 
gas consuming devices, cogeneration facilities or gas based industrial 
processes will be the stimulus not only for increased gas consumption 
but eventually also for the technology improvements on the gas 
supply-side. 
The findings of the IIASA gas study report a market share of 26% by 
the year 2030. Compared with the technology substitution model , 
depicted in Figure I, this is less than 50% of the market share derived 
from historically observed substitution dynamics. As a matter of fact, in 
the past the market penetration of methane has been slower than, eg, 
the displacement of coal by oil. Again, this observation points to the 
historical situation of gas as a dependent fuel, initially as a manufac-
tured fuel from coal and later of oil. Current gas technologies are either 
old or oil-based technologies. 
To that extent, the technical progress underlying the Technical 
Evolution Scenario may be too conservative, in particular, for those 
markets where the expansion of methane use encounters technical 
difficulties - the transport sector and feedstocks. Both sectors must 
eventually accommodate methane if the market share of natural gas is to 
exceed the 30% threshold. 
The Technical Evolution Scenario is based primarily on technoecono-
mic considerations and omits all the equally important policy aspects, 
institutional, supply security and geopolitical factors. Combined, these 
factors may, or may not, impede the prospects for natural gas in the 
short- to medium term. It is then the task of technology to eventually 
mitigate these impediments. On the other hand, gas offers a viable 
alternative to the imminent environmental problems. On all counts, 
methane is superior to other fossil fuels. 
The purpose of this exercise concerns the possible impact of future 
technical evolution on future energy mixes. The analyses attempt to 
show that the least likely event - no technical progress, which is the 
usual concept in long-term energy analyses - precludes intriguing 
alternatives a priori. This is not to say that the potential developments 
outlined here will become imminent. However, the crucial question is 
25 
Technology and prospects for nawral gas 
26 
'how well are we protected against future technical surprise while 
planning continues in a constant technology environment?' First of all 
this question is of importance for energy policy and research and 
development at the level of national governments and international 
organizations. And equally important for industries involved in long-
term energy projects such as utilities, exploration, drilling and mining 
companies and energy equipment manufacturers. 
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